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      Abstract— Mobile malware has continued to grow at an 
alarming rate despite on-going mitigation efforts. This has been 
much more prevalent on Android due to being an open platform 
that is rapidly overtaking other competing platforms in the 
mobile smart devices market. Recently, a new generation of 
Android malware families has emerged with advanced evasion 
capabilities which make them much more difficult to detect 
using conventional methods. This paper proposes and 
investigates a parallel machine learning based classification 
approach for early detection of Android malware. Using real 
malware samples and benign applications, a composite 
classification model is developed from parallel combination of 
heterogeneous classifiers. The empirical evaluation of the model 
under different combination schemes demonstrates its efficacy 
and potential to improve detection accuracy. More importantly, 
by utilizing several classifiers with diverse characteristics, their 
strengths can be harnessed not only for enhanced Android 
malware detection but also quicker white box analysis by means 
of the more interpretable constituent classifiers.  
      Keywords- Android; malware detection; machine learning; 
data mining; parallel classifiers; static analysis; mobile security . 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Android malware is growing at an astonishing rate despite 
the measures currently in use to curtail infection amongst the 
growing population of Android users worldwide. The primary 
means of Android app distribution is via app markets, and 
several unofficial online app stores are emerging alongside the 
official Google Play app store. In 2012 Google announced the 
use of ‘Bouncer’ to screen apps being submitted to its official 
app store for malicious behavior. In fact, the analysis process 
of Bouncer, which is based on run-time dynamic analysis, has 
been demonstrated by Oberheide and Miller to be vulnerable 
to detection avoidance by well-crafted malicious apps [1]. 
Android malware have been found in both official and third 
party stores. For example, DroidDream was distributed 
through the official Android Market and according to 
Symantec affected 50,000 to 200,000 users. The third party 
app stores that have emerged in recent years have also become 
a very potent source of malicious app distribution as these 
stores have weak to non-existent measures to prevent 
malicious apps from being uploaded and distributed to users’ 
devices.     
Studies such as [2] have revealed that current families of 
Android malware are difficult to promptly spot in the wild. 
This is because of the evasion techniques being used to 
conceal malicious payload, usually within seemingly 
innocuous apps that provide functionalities that users want. By 
employing polymorphic techniques and encrypting malicious 
payload, signature-based scanning is easily bypassed. With 
increased code obfuscation, malware analysts take longer to 
uncover the malicious behavior, classify samples, and 
generate signatures for detecting the new threats. Moreover, 
some Android malware families like AnserverBot are known 
to have the capability to fetch and execute malicious payloads 
at run time thus rendering the zero-day detection of such 
malware by prior signatures quite ineffective.  
 These challenges call for new and more effective 
detection approaches to mitigate the impact of evolving 
Android malware. Hence, in this paper we propose a method 
for early detection of Android malware by means of parallel 
machine learning classifiers that utilize diverse algorithms 
with inherently different characteristics. A number of static 
app features are used in the learning phase of the model 
development. The trained models are combined using various 
combination schemes to yield a composite model that 
produces a verdict of ‘suspicious’ or ‘benign’ in order to 
classify a given new application. 
Utilizing diverse machine learning classifiers in parallel 
for Android malware detection, has potential benefits beyond 
accuracy improvement. It is possible to harness the various 
strengths of the constituent classifiers in other ways such as 
complementing white box analysis through close observation 
of intermediate output from the more interpretable base 
models. 
The main contributions of this paper are the following: 
 A new Android malware detection approach is 
developed using parallel machine learning classifiers. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to 
investigate such an approach for proactive Android 
malware detection. 
 Extensive empirical evaluation of the approach by 
means of real malware samples and benign 
applications, demonstrating its real-world applicability 
and capacity for improved detection accuracy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
briefly describes Android application structure and how it 
provides the app features that underpin our machine learning 
based malware detection approach. Section III presents the 
machine learning classification algorithms used to develop the 
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composite classification schemes. Section IV describes the 
methodology employed to investigate and evaluate the 
performance of the proposed malware detection approach. 
Section V presents the evaluation results and discussions. 
Section VI discusses related works. Finally, section VII draws 
conclusions and highlights our future work. 
II. ANDROID APPLICATION STRUCTURE AND FEATURE 
EXTRACTION  
A. Android application basics 
An Android application (app) is built from four different 
types of components: Activities, Services, Broadcast 
Receivers, and Content Providers. Activities are the 
components that provide GUI functionality to enable user 
interactivity, whilst Services and Broadcast Receivers operate 
in the background when an app is running. Content providers 
encapsulate data to provide to an app via an interface. Many 
Android apps consist of at least a number of Activities that are 
invoked via intents, whilst the other three building blocks may 
optionally be present depending on the app’s functionality. 
Android apps are written in Java and compiled into a 
single archive file (Android package or APK), along with data 
and resource files. Android-powered devices use this APK to 
install the application. An APK consists of several 
components including: (1) an XML manifest file containing 
information such as app description, components declaration 
(i.e. Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers etc.), and 
permissions. (2) A Classes.dex file that is a Dalvik executable 
file that runs in its own instance of a Dalvik Virtual Machine. 
(3) A /res directory for indexed resources like icons, images, 
music etc. (4) A /lib directory for compiled code. (5) /META-
INF folder holding the app certificate and list of resources, 
SHA-1 digest etc. (6) Resources.arsc which is a compiled 
resource file. 
B.  App feature extraction for machine learning 
The malware detection approach investigated in this paper 
utilizes the static features of an Android app extracted from 
the APK file in order to determine whether it contains 
malicious payload or not. It therefore relies on a trained 
composite classification model (described later) to arrive at 
the decision.  The features employed in training the machine 
learning model are extracted from a corpus of malware 
samples and benign apps using a bespoke APK analysis tool 
written in Java. Details of the APK analysis tool can be found 
in our previous work [3]. 
  Three categories of features are used for the learning 
phase: 1) API related features 2) App permissions 3) Standard 
OS and Android framework commands. The API related 
features are obtained by mining the Classes.dex file using the 
steps described in [3]. They consists of keywords which 
enable detection of the use of selected standard Android API 
calls (through which the app interacts with various device 
functionalities) as well as selected Java API calls used to 
enrich apps’ functionality.  
The permission features are keywords that map onto the 
standard Android permissions which are declared in the 
manifest file, therefore enabling the extraction of the 
permissions being requested by the app for its functionalities. 
For example SEND_SMS keyword allows for the detection of 
the permission request for the app to be able to send SMS 
messages, if declared in the manifest file. The commands 
related features are keywords that detect the presence of Linux 
commands such as ‘chown’, ‘mount’ etc. or certain parameters 
which might be used with these commands. These commands 
are usually embedded in hidden files within the APK and 
invoked by rogue apps to enable unusual activities like 
privilege escalation, launching hidden scripts or embedded 
malicious binary files, or concealment of malicious activities. 
Table I presents an overview of the features under their 
various categories. 
TABLE I.   OVERVIEW OF FEATURES EXTRACTED FROM THE APPS AND 
THEIR BROAD CATEGORIES 
Type Features (keywords) 
API calls 
related 
abortBroadcast; getDeviceId; getSubscriberId; 
getCallState;getSimSerialNumber; getLineNumber; 
getSimCountryIso; getNetworkOperator; 
getSimOperator; getPackageManager; Runtime.exec(); 
android.provider.Contacts; 
android.provider.ContactsContract; HttpPost_init; 
HttpGet_init; HttpUriRequest; SMSReceiver; 
bindService; onActivityResult; SecretKey;KeySpec; 
FindClass; createSubprocess; Ljavax_crypto_Cipher; 
Ljavax_crypto_spec_Secret; DexClassLoader; 
sendMultipartTextMessage; Ljava_net_URLDecoder; 
native; System.loadLibrary; reflectgetClass; getMethod; 
registerReceiver; intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED; 
intent.action.RUN 
Command 
related 
mount; remount; chmod; chown; /res; /system/bin; 
/system/bin/sh; /system/app; .jar; .apk; 
pmsetInstallLocation; pminstall; GET_META_DATA; 
GET_RECEIVERS; GET_SERVICES; 
GET_SIGNATURES; GET_PERMISSIONS 
Permissions ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION; 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION; WRITE_SMS; 
SEND_SMS;  WRITE_CALL_LOG; 
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS; BROADCAST_SMS; 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED; RECEIVE_MMS; 
RECEIVE_SMS; RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH; 
RECORD_AUDIO; CALL_PHONE; 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE; 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE; CLEAR_APP_CACHE; 
INSTALL_PACKAGES; INTERNET; 
CAMERA;CHANGE_CONFIGURATION; 
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE 1              
 1 A total of 125 permissions are used. 
III. MACHINE LEARNING MODELS FOR THE PARALLEL 
CLASSIFICATION APPROACH  
Machine learning (ML) classifiers have played a part in 
the development of intelligent systems for several domains 
over the years. ML approaches are gaining traction in 
identification and detection of malware on both mobile and 
PC platforms. Our work is based on supervised machine 
learning whereby the features described in the previous 
section are acquired from a labelled dataset and used to build 
and train a model. The ML algorithms considered in our 
investigation include: Decision Tree (tree-based), Simple 
Logistic (function-based), Naïve Bayes (probabilistic), PART 
(rule-based), and RIDOR (rule-based). 
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  Our proposed approach in this paper for a machine 
learning based zero-day Android malware detection is a 
composite model of the aforementioned heterogeneous 
classifiers utilized in various parallel combination schemes. 
The approach is intended to leverage the strengths of different 
kinds of supervised learning algorithms to produce a single 
classification verdict for new applications. Hence, the 
composite model is built from a function-based, tree-based, 
probabilistic, and two rule based algorithms. Figure 1 
illustrates the building blocks of the detection approach.   The 
rule based classifiers produce the most easily interpretable 
output whilst the probabilistic classifier is most easily 
amenable to post-training sensitivity tuning. 
Rule-based 
classifier
function-based 
classifier
Tree-based 
classifier 
Probabilistic 
classifier
Combination 
function 
Input training 
matrix
New app 
feature vector
Intermediate 
output
Suspicious?
No
Yes
New Android app
 
Fig. 1.  Android malware detection with the composite parallel classifier 
approach. 
The constituent ML algorithms of the parallel detector 
include: 
Decision Tree (DT):  Decision trees are generally known 
as ‘divide and conquer’ algorithms. Decision trees are 
sequential models which logically combine a sequence of 
simple tests where a numerical attribute (feature) is compared 
against a threshold value or a nominal attribute (feature) 
against a set of possible values [4]. It is essentially a flow 
chart like structure where each internal node denotes a test on 
an attribute with each branch representing an outcome of the 
test and each leaf holding a class label. 
Simple Logistic (SL): is an ensemble learning algorithm 
which utilizes additive logistic regression using simple 
regression functions as base learners [5]. Similar to linear 
regression, it tries to find a function that will fit the training 
data well by computing the weights that maximizes the log-
likelihood of the logistic regression function. SL classifier 
takes relatively longer to train but is fast in classification. 
Naïve Bayes (NB): The Naïve Bayes classifier operates on 
the (naïve) assumption of independence of all the features. 
Despite this simplifying assumption, NB learners and 
classifiers perform quite well in many real-life applications, 
most famously in document classification and spam filtering. 
Compared to more sophisticated methods, NB learning and 
classification can be extremely fast. 
PART: is a ‘separate-and-conquer’ rule learner which 
produces ordered sets of rules called ‘decision lists’ [6]. 
Features from a new app will be compared to each rule in the 
list in turn, and the app is assigned the category of the first 
matching rule (a default is applied if no rule successfully 
matches). PART builds a partial C4.5 decision tree in each 
iteration and then turns the “best” leaf into a rule.  
RIDOR: Ridor (Ripple Down Rule learner) [7] is a rule 
learning algorithm that generates a default rule and then 
exceptions to the default rule with the least weighted error 
rate. It generates the best exception for each exception and 
iterates until pure thus performing a tree-like expansion of 
exceptions. The exceptions are the rules that predict classes 
other than the default. Ridor also falls under the general class 
of ‘separate and conquer’ ML algorithms. 
IV. INVESTIGATION  METHODOLOGY  
A.  Input preprocessing 
By means of our bespoke APK analysis tool described in 
[2], the features depicted in Table 1, were extracted and 
preprocessed into a matrix of input vectors for training the 
machine learning algorithms. Each column of the matrix 
represented a single feature, while the rows represented the 
feature vectors from a single app from the training corpus. The 
feature vectors were made up of (one of possible values of) 1’s 
and 0’s depicting the presence or absence of the corresponding 
column feature respectively, as detected by the APK analysis 
tool.  A total of 179 training features were extracted, with the 
breakdown as follows: API calls and commands related: 54 
features. App permissions: 125.  
B.  Model training 
Since supervised learning is the underlying method being 
used, the training set consisted of app samples labelled in one 
of two classes; suspicious or benign. A total of 6,863 
applications (from McAfee internal repository) were utilized; 
2925 malicious apps and 3,938 non-malicious apps. Thus, the 
input training matrix is of size 6,836 by 180 (179 features and 
1 column with the class label). 
C.  Model evaluation 
In order to evaluate the performance of the classifier 
model, the 10-fold cross validation technique is applied to the 
matrix. Thus, the dataset is partitioned into 10 equal parts, k1, 
k2, k3 to k10 without overlaps. Each step in the evaluation 
takes one partition as test data and applies a trained model 
from the other 9 parts. The results are averaged to provide a 
final performance results for the classifier. k-fold cross 
validation technique is a very popular ML evaluation method 
and is appropriate to our goal of determining the relative 
effectiveness of the ML classifiers in detecting unknown 
malicious apps which is emulated by the non-overlapping 
testing partitions. 
The following performance metrics are used to investigate 
the parallel classifier approach to Android malware detection. 
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 True positive ratio (TPR): This is the ratio of correctly 
classified malicious apps to the total number of 
malicious apps in the dataset. 
 True negative ratio (TNR): The ratio of correctly 
classified benign apps to the total number of benign 
apps in the dataset. 
 False positive ratio (FPR): The ratio of incorrectly 
classified benign apps to the total number of benign 
apps in the dataset. 
 False negative ratio (FNR): The ratio of incorrectly 
classified malicious apps to the total number of 
malicious apps in the dataset. 
 Accuracy (ACC):  This is the total accuracy of the 
classifier given by (TPR + TNR)/ (TPR + TNR + FPR 
+ FNR). 
 Error ratio (ERR):  This is computed from: 1-ACC. 
 AUC (Area under ROC): ROC is the receiver 
operation characteristics curve. AUC is an estimate of 
the area under ROC which indicates the predictive 
power of the classifier. Classifiers with higher AUC 
have better predictive power and can provide for 
better sensitivity tuning. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
A.  Experiment 1: Individual classifiers experiments  
In order to obtain baseline results for investigating the 
parallel classifiers approach to Android malware detection, the 
first set of experiments were performed with each of the 
individual candidate classification algorithms for the 
composite model. These include the Naïve Bayes, PART, 
RIDOR, Decision Tree and Simple Logistic discussed in 
section III. 
The results from each of these classifiers are summarized 
together in Table II. The preprocessed input training matrix 
and the training-testing methodology described in section IV 
were applied in turn to each classifier to obtain the results 
presented in Table II. 
TABLE II.   PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM THE 5 INDIVIDUAL 
CLASSIFIERS. 
 
Algorithm 
Performance metrics 
TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR AUC 
NB 0.821 0.913 0.087 0.179 0.867 0.133 0.915 
SL 0.909 0.954 0.046 0.091 0.932 0.068 0.977 
DT 0.948 0.960 0.040 0.052 0.954 0.046 0.964 
RIDOR 0.957 0.942 0.058 0.043 0.950 0.050 0.949 
PART 0.958 0.967 0.033 0.042 0.963 0.037 0.970 
 
The NB classifier can be seen to have the least detection 
ratio (TPR) of all the five classifiers, and also the least overall 
accuracy. The SL classifier has the next best malware 
detection capability with about 91% detection ratio whilst DT, 
RIDOR and PART showed better detection with 94.8%, 
95.7% and 95.8% respectively. In terms of the overall 
accuracy/error rates, PART proved to be the best performer.  
B.  Implications for parallel classification 
Recall that PART derives its decision rules from partial 
decision trees by selecting the ‘best’ leaf from a branch in 
each iteration. The number of decision rules derived for the 
PART model built from the full 6863 by 180 matrix training 
dataset was 74 rules. Hence, from our proposed 179 features, 
a compact rule set is built with PART which is small enough 
to be used in a parallel classification scenario without 
incurring excessive classification overhead for new 
applications. With the RIDOR algorithm, an even smaller rule 
set of 25 rules was derived. As for the Decision Tree (J48 
algorithm), 143 leaves resulted from model building. This 
means we have a relatively small decision tree with at most 
143 decision branches. The SL model takes the longest to 
train since weights have to be determined for each feature in 
order to fit a logistic regression model to the data. On the other 
hand, classification of new applications is fast since an already 
trained model requires only linear additive and multiplicative 
steps in the decision stage. The NB model is fast to train 
because it involves calculation of probabilities from the 
frequencies derived from the input matrix. It is also fast in 
classification because, like the SL, a decision involves only 
linear multiplicative and additive computations. Hence, NB 
and SL are deemed along with the other 3 obtained models, 
suitable for a combined parallel classification scheme, due to 
the overall low computational overhead involved in 
classifying new applications in order to detect the presence of 
malicious payload. 
C. Experiment 2: parallel classifiers experiments 
In the second set of experiments, the combined 
classification approach which involved a parallel combination 
of classification decisions obtained from each individual 
classifier was investigated. Four different combination 
schemes were considered: 
Average of probabilities: i.e. an average of the probabilities 
of each class (suspicious/benign) from the individual 
classifiers. Thus, a new application is considered suspicious if: 
Avg. (P1sus + P2sus + P3sus + P4sus + P5sus) > Avg. (P1ben + 
P2ben + P3ben + P4ben + P5ben). Otherwise, it is classed as 
benign. 
Product of probabilities: i.e. product of the probabilities of 
each class (suspicious/benign) from the individual classifiers. 
Thus, a new application is considered suspicious if:  (P1sus · 
P2sus · P3sus · P4sus · P5sus) > (P1ben · P2ben · P3ben · P4ben· 
P5ben). Otherwise, it is classed as benign. 
Maximum probability: i.e. The maximum probabilities for 
each class (suspicious/benign) of the probabilities output from 
individual classifier are compared. Thus, a new application is 
considered suspicious if:  Max (P1sus, P2sus, P3sus, P4sus, P5sus) 
> Max (P1ben, P2ben, P3ben, P4ben, P5ben). Otherwise, it is 
classed as benign. 
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Majority vote: For majority vote, individual class decisions 
are made by each classifier. The majority verdict is taking as 
the final output decision class. 
The results for the various combination schemes used in 
the parallel classification approach are shown in Table III. The 
detection rate (TPR) of the parallel classifier approach either 
equaled or performed better than any of the single classifier 
baseline TPRs obtained in the first set of experiments. With 
the maximum probability scheme, the best detection rate 
performance of 97.5% is obtained. This is a detection accuracy 
improvement over the 95.7% that obtains from the best 
individual classifier performance in the first set of 
experiments. The improvement equates to about 50 more 
malware samples detected in the former scheme than the 
latter. The detection rate improvement comes at the price of a 
slight increase in the FPR over that of the best performing 
individual classifier. However, the products of probabilities 
scheme improves the detection rate to 97.3% without 
incurring an increase in FPR when compared to the 
performance of the individual classifiers in Table II. 
TABLE III.   PERFORMANCE RESULTS FROM FOUR PARALLEL 
COMBINATION SCHEMES UTILIZING THE 5 CLASSIFIERS 
 
Combination 
Performance metrics 
TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC ERR AUC 
AvgProb 0.957 0.969 0.031 0.043 0.963 0.037 0.988 
ProdProb 0.973 0.970 0.030 0.027 0.972 0.028 0.953 
MaxProb 0.975 0.928 0.072 0.025 0.952 0.048 0.986 
MVote 0.957 0.969 0.031 0.043 0.963 0.037 0.963 
 
From Table III, it can be seen that the best accuracy and 
TNR results come from the products of probabilities 
combination schemes. All the identification, error/accuracy 
results from the products of probabilities parallel classifiers 
scheme are better than the baseline performance results from 
the individual classifiers in the previous set of experiments.  
The results in Table III demonstrate the efficacy of applying 
parallel classifiers to detection of Android malware using the 
features and approach described in this paper. Considering the 
relatively low classification overhead that the selected diverse 
base classifiers present, we consider the proposed 
classification approach a practically viable means of 
improving Android malware detection to complement existing 
solutions. Especially, for detecting zero-day Android malware 
for which no signatures have been derived. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
The two main approaches applicable to malware analysis 
are dynamic analysis and static analysis. Most existing 
research aimed at non-signature based detection of Android 
malware generally utilizes either a dynamic or static analysis 
approach. A few exceptions like the AAS sandbox presented 
in [8] combine both approaches. Android malware detection 
approaches based on dynamic analysis can be found in 
Crowdroid proposed by Burguera et al. in [9]. Crowdroid is a 
behavior based malware detection system for Android that 
uses run-time system call features and clustering algorithms to 
detect Android malware. MADAM [10] is also a dynamic 
analysis based anomaly detector for Android malware. 
MADAM monitors Android at the kernel-level and user-level 
and applies machine learning classifiers.  MADAM was tested 
on 10 monitored real malware and according to the authors, 
showed a negligible impact on the user experience.  
In [11], Shabtai et al. proposed Andromaly, a host-based 
Android malware detection solution that employs dynamic 
analysis. Andromaly continuously monitors various features 
and events like CPU consumption, number of packets sent, 
number of running processes, keyboard/touch-screen pressing 
etc. Machine learning anomaly detectors are then applied to 
classify the collected data into normal or abnormal. In [12], 
AntiMalDroid was proposed by Zhao et al. AntiMalDroid is a 
dynamic analysis behavior based malware detection 
framework that uses logged behavior sequence as features for 
SVM model training and detection. 
Different from these previous works that are based on 
dynamic analysis, the approach in this paper employs a static 
analysis based approach for malware detection. In this case, 
static code properties are used to proactively identify malware 
before it is installed and run on a device. Hence our method 
can be applied to screening a large number of apps on an app 
market in a relatively short time period.  Furthermore, the 
resource constraints imposed by the handheld devices are 
avoided by our approach. Another important advantage of a 
static based approach over a dynamic one is that it is 
undetectable by the malware itself i.e. malware cannot modify 
its behavior during analysis [2].  Static analysis offers faster, 
less resource intensive and more code coverage in less time 
than dynamic runtime analysis.  
Previous Android malware analysis works which employ 
static analysis include DroidMat [13]. DroidMat uses k-means 
clustering to detect malware based on static functional 
behaviors derived from API and permissions detected in the 
application. In [14], a static analysis based Bayesian 
classification method was developed to categorize apps into 
‘benign’ or ‘suspicious’ using 58 static code-based features. 
The training and classification employed 1000 Android 
malware samples from 49 families and 1000 benign 
applications. The approach in [15] utilized permissions and 
call flow graphs for training SVM models to distinguish 
between benign and malicious Android apps. The authors 
derived one-class SVM models based on the benign samples 
alone and use these for identification of both benign and 
malicious apps. In [16], the authors also apply machine 
learning with static analysis, but utilize Linux malware rather 
than Android malware samples. Their approach extracts Linux 
system commands within Android and use the readelf 
command to output a list of referenced function calls for each 
system command. The same method is used to extract a static 
list of function calls with 240 Linux virus, worms, and 
Trojans. Both sets are applied to train PART, Prism and 
Nearest Neighbor algorithms for classification.  
In [17], Sanz et al compared various machine learning 
schemes trained with permission features on their malware 
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detection accuracy. Their analysis was based on 249 malware 
samples and 347 benign apps. Sarma et al. [18] and Peng et al. 
[19] also apply permissions to train SVM based and Bayesian 
based models respectively for risk ranking of Android apps. 
The study in this paper also utilizes permissions as features 
but differs from the previous by including a more extensive 
feature set not used in the previous works. For example, 
command related features are not used in previous works 
(except in [14]). From our experience, these features have 
been found to be quite effective in enhancing the classification 
accuracy of trained machine learning models that are based on 
static analysis. Moreover, this paper proposes and evaluates a 
more effective way of leveraging static code features for 
Android malware through parallel machine learning 
classification schemes. The research in [2] and [20] are some 
of the previous work that are not based on machine learning 
approaches but do apply static analysis for Android malware 
detection. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
In this paper a parallel classification approach to Android 
malware detection using inherently diverse machine learning 
algorithms was investigated. The proposed approach utilized a 
wide range of features which included API calls related, 
commands related and permission features. The recent 
increase in Android malware and their growing ability for 
adept detection avoidance of existing signature-based 
approaches definitely calls for novel alternatives. The parallel 
classification approach proposed in this paper is a viable 
scheme that provides a complementary tool that not only 
potentially improves Android malware detection but also 
allows the strengths of diverse classifiers to be leveraged. For 
example, the rule based classifiers can provide human-
interpretable intermediate output that can be useful for driving 
further analysis stages. Furthermore, the proposed approach is 
ideal from performance point of view since it is cost effective 
in classifying a new application because: 1) static app features 
are employed and 2) the selected constituent classification 
models have low computational requirements during 
classification decision.  
As future work, we aim to develop and evaluate an 
Android malware detection engine using the investigated 
approach. Further study involving the performance tuning of 
the detection engine when applied to new datasets from 
emerging Android app markets will also be considered.  
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